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ACTIONABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER SECTION
1983 AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

Federal civil rights actions brought by prison inmates seeking
redress of alleged constitutional violations by state prison officials
have proliferated in recent years.1 A significant number of these
suits are damage actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging violations of the eighth amendment's guarantee of freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment.3 These cases raise some of
the most difficult legal issues in the field of civil rights litigation.
One question is the sufficiency of allegations of official negligence to
support a cause of action in eighth amendment claims brought purl In 1960 few if any civil rights actions were filed by state prisoners in federal

courts.

ADmmnSTRATmVE OFFICE OF THE UNiTED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

OF T=E DnmcTon,

1977, at 204. In contrast, during the statistical year June 1976-

June 1977, state prisoners filed 7,752 civil rights suits in federal district courts, of
a total of 130,567 civil cases. Id. 206. Of the 10,980 civil appeals brought from
the district courts to the courts of appeals, id. 172, 774 were state prisoner civil
rights actions, id. 173.
According to one source, "[t]he two most important federal statutes for facilitating inmates' access to the courts are the habeas corpus statute and the Civil
Rights Act." Robinson & Jensen, Breaking Down the "Walls of Silence," 29 Ann. J.
225, 229 (1974) (footnote omitted). The large increase in the number of prisoner
suits during the 1960's and 1970's, however, was a function of the in forma pauperis
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976), permitting indigents to file suits without
cost in district court, as well as a consequence of the emergence of the civil rights
statutes as an important vehicle for redress of constitutional violations by state
officials. See Note, Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in the Federal
Courts, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 115, 116 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Limitation of
State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits].
2 Section 1983 provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Prisoners are not, however, the only beneficiaries of the reemergence of § 1983
as a key to the redress of deprivations of constitutional rights. The total number
of civil rights suits in 1960 was 280. ADMINisTrATrvE OFCE OF THE UNITED
STATES CoTRTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DRECTOR, 1960, at 232. By the statistical
year June 1976-June 1977 the number of non-prisoner civil rights actions filed in
federal district courts had increased to 13,113. ADmimNsTRATrvE OFFICE OF THE
UNrrED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPoRT OF THE DmEcToR, 1977, at 179. This
figure includes cases filed under all civil rights statutes, including the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; it also, however, reflects a substantial increase in the number of § 1983
suits.
3 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
(533)
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suant to section 1983. This Comment will address that issue, focusing on both statutory and constitutional standards. 4 The analysis
will consider: 1) Whether allegations of official negligence are sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1983 in general, and 2)
If so, whether negligence is sufficient under the constitutional standard imposed by the eighth amendment. 5
Judicial confusion is often apparent in opinions dealing with
standards of conduct under section 1983. Frequently courts fail to
recognize that the issue of statutory standards is both separable and
distinct from the question of the requirements imposed by particular constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court has provided
little guidance to resolve this confusion: presented with three opportunities to address the question of the sufficiency of a claim of
negligence to support a cause of action brought under section 1983,6
the Court focused on the requisite constitutional standards in two
of the cases, 7 and decided the third, a case in which certiorari was
granted specifically to resolve the section 1983 negligence issue, on
immunity grounds.8 Some lower courts have interpreted these deci4 This Comment's discussion of statutory standards of conduct under § 1983 is
limited to the standard appropriate in damage actions. Injunctive suits present
different problems and considerations relative to questions of federalism, because
equitable relief involves a greater degree of judicial intervention by federal courts
into state and local affairs. The central issue in injunctive actions is generally not
individual liability, but proof of systemic deprivations. Accordingly, the relief
sought involves more fundamental changes in local governmental activities than do
individual damage actions. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme
Court placed some important limitations on § 1983 injunctive actions. It may well
be that the standard advocated in this Comment for § 1983 damage suits is equally
appropriate for injunctive actions, but to reach that conclusion requires consideration
of factors beyond the scope of this Comment.
A third type of civil rights suit-actions brought directly under the Constitution,
including claims brought against state officials directly under the fourteenth amendment and suits against federal officers brought pursuant to various constitutional
guarantees-has also emerged as an important vehicle for redressing various constitutional deprivations in recent years as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). See Lehmann, Bivens and Its Progeny, 4 HAsTmcs CoNsT. L.Q. 531
(1977). But see Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 308 (1978) (suggesting that damages in Bivens-type actions may
be available only in fourth amendment suits).
5 Although the focus of the statutory analysis of this Comment is the § 1983
damage action, the eighth amendment discussion is equally applicable to injunctive
suits and actions brought directly under the Constitution.
6Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
7Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), considered the standard of care in
medical claims brought pursuant to the eighth amendment; Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), dealt with discriminatory impact of hiring practices in light
of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
8 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), involved a § 1983 action by a
prisoner against state officials who allegedly interfered with his outgoing mail in
violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights. Despite certification of the
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sions to require more than negligence in all section 1983 cases. 9 The
Court's carefully limited opinions cannot be read to confirm or
contradict this interpretation. It is equally possible that the decisions are based on other grounds because there is no general standard of conduct under section 1983. In light of the Court's silence,
the safest and most logical conclusion is that it has simply chosen
not to address the question.
The controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of the
scope of section 1983 centers on the problem of the "constitutional
tort." Those favoring a restrictive interpretation of the statute
argue that negligence on the part of state officials can never be
sufficient to establish a cause of action under section 1983, even
when the negligent act or omission results in the violation of a constitutionally protected right. Proponents of a narrow interpretation of section 1983 make the federalism argument that the statute
should not be used to provide remedies for "constitutional torts"
since these are problems more properly regulated by the states. 10
Those who take a broader view of the scope of section 1983 contend that the statute itself establishes no general standard of care;
any such standard must turn on the nature of the specific constitutional guarantee. Supporters of this interpretation argue that the
drafters of the statute intended section 1983 to be a federal remedy
for constitutional torts because Congress perceived something inherently more serious than an ordinary tort in an act or omission
by a state official, clothed in the authority of state law, resulting in
the deprivation of a constitutional right.1
If the statute imposes no restrictions upon actions founded in
negligence, possible constitutional standards of conduct must be
considered. This issue is especially difficult to resolve in the case
of the eighth amendment, since it prohibits the infliction of cruel
specific question "[whether negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing

letters states a cause of action under section 1983," id. 559 n.6, the Court based its
decision on immunity grounds.

Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court

ruled in favor of the prison officials and held their good faith immunity defense
applicable because no clear first and fourteenth amendment right of freedom from
interference with outgoing mail had been judicially established at the time of the
alleged infringement. Id. 565. For a brief discussion of federal immunity doctrines,
see note 99 infra.
9 See cases cited in note 77 infra.
10 The essential notion is that official misconduct, even that resulting in constitutional deprivations, should be regulated by state law. Section 1983 suits would
be allowed only in very special circumstances, such as instances of outrageous conduct. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 320-29 (1965). See also McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983, 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 54-55 (1974).
11 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 193 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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and unusual punishment. It must be determined whether suffering
resulting from the negligence of prison officials, rather than from
their reckless or intentional misconduct, violates a constitutionally
imposed duty of care, and, as such, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Lower federal courts diverge in their answer to the
question of general requirements applicable to all eighth amendment claims, but converge on the answer to the question of what
standards are necessary for medical malpractice claims. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve these legal conundrums
in 1976 with its decision in Estelle v. Gamble.12 Unfortunately, this
decision did little more than approve the standard applied by the
great majority of the lower federal courts in medical claims cases;
the opinion failed to clarify the proper standard for other eighth
amendment actions or for section 1983 suits in general.
This Comment argues that section 1983 does not impose a
standard of conduct requirement. It argues further that the requisites of an eighth amendment cause of action may be satisfied by
allegations of negligent misconduct in many, though not all, circumstances. The analysis below begins in section II with a discussion of the statutory requirements. This discussion considers the
statute's legislative history, the case law interpreting section 1983,
and policy considerations relevant to modem interpretation of its
language. Section III examines possible standards imposed by the
eighth amendment, considering in brief the development of recent
case law concerning eighth amendment actions brought pursuant to
section 1983. Following this discussion is an analysis of relevant
aspects of Estelle v. Gamble, in section IV, including four subsequent lower court decisions. Section V presents a proposed test to
determine the sufficiency of negligence in eighth amendment actions. This test is based on the character of the official act or omission and the extent to which the risk of the particular harm suffered
is increased by imprisonment.
II. THE

STATUTORY STANDARD

Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
12429

U.S. 97 (1976).

1978]

ACTIONABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
person injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
13
proper proceeding for redress.
The language of section 1983 was originally enacted as the first
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,14 the primary purpose of
which was to enforce the fourteenth amendment through the imposition of civil and criminal liabilities 15 on those who deprived
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
34 Ch. 22, 17 Stat 13 (1871).
15 Section 1983 is one of the civil liability provisions of the 1871 act. The
other sections of the 1866 and 1871 Civil Rights Acts surviving today are 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3) (civil liability) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242 (criminal
liability). In full, the 1871 Act provided:
CHAP. XXII.-An Act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person who,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any
such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to
the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the
United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon
error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the
provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixtysix, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication;" and the other
remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in
such cases.
SEC. 2: That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of
the United States shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or
to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war
against the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent,
hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force
to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the
authority thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any person
from accepting or holding any office or trust or place of confidence under
the United States, or from discharging the duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer of the United States to leave any
State, district, or place where his duties as such officer might lawfully be
performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his
lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his person while
engaged in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge
of his official duty, or by force, intimidation, or threat to deter any party or
vitness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or
from testifying in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to injure any such party or witness in his person or property on
account of his having so attended or testified, or by force, intimidation, or
threat to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment, of any juror or
grand juror in any court of the United States, or to injure such juror in his
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others of constitutionally protected rights. Although the principal
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment
lawfully assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been,
such juror, or shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public
highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either directly or
indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws,
or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal
protection of the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of in any
manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of
justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the
United States the due and equal protection of the laws, or to injure any
person in his person or his property for lawfully enforcing the right of any
person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws, or by force,
intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the United States lawfully
entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a lawful manner
towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an
elector of President or Vice President of the United States, or as a member
of the Congress of the United States, or to injure any such citizen in his
person or property on account of such support or advocacy, each and every
person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon
conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States or
district or supreme court of any Territory of the United States having
jurisdiction of similar offences, shall be punished by a fine not less than
five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with
or without hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not less
than six months nor more than six years, as the court may determine, or
by both such fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine. And if
any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
person so injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and
maintain an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or more of the
persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted in the
proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in
like cases in such courts under the provisions of the act of April ninth,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in
the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their
vindication."
SEc. 3. That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder
the execution of the laws thereof, and of the United States, as to deprive
any portion or class of the people of such State of any of the rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection, named in the Constitution and secured
by this act, and the constituted authorities of such State shall either be
unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of
the people in such rights, such facts shall be deemed a denial by such
State of the equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled under
the Constitution of the United States; and in all such cases, or whenever
any such insurrection, violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy shall
oppose or obstruct the laws of the United States or the due execution
thereof, or impede or obstruct the due course of justice under the same, it
shall be lawful for the President, and it shall be his duty, to take such
measures, by the employment of the militia or the land and naval forces
of the United States, or of either, or by other means, as he may deem necessary for the suppression of such insurrection, domestic violence, or com-
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binations; and any person who shall be arrested under the provisions of
this and the preceding section shall be delivered to the marshal of the
proper district, to be dealt with according to law.
SEC. 4. That whenever in any State or part of a State the unlawful
combinations named in the preceding section of this act shall be organized
and armed, and so numerous and powerful as to be able, by violence, to
either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted authorities of such State,
and of the United States within such State, or when the constituted
authorities are in complicity with, or shall connive at the unlawful purposes
of, such powerful and armed combinations; and whenever, by reason of
either or all of the causes aforesaid, the conviction of such offenders and
the preservation of the public safety shall become in such district impracticable, in every such case such combinations shall be deemed a rebellion
against the Government of the United States, and during the continuance
of such rebellion, and within the limits of the district which shall be so
under the sway thereof, such limits to be prescribed by proclamation, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, when in his judgment
the public safety shall require it, to suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus, to the end that such rebellion may be overthrown: Provided,
That all the provisions of the second section of an act entitled "An act
relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain
cases,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, which
relate to the discharge of prisoners other than prisoners of war, and to the
penalty for refusing to obey the order of the court, shall be in fall force
so far as the same are applicable to the provisions of this section: Provided
further, That the President shall first have made proclamation, as now
provided by law, commanding such insurgents to disperse: And provided
also, That the provisions of this section shall not be in force after the end
of the next regular session of Congress.
SEC. 5. That no person shall be a grand or petit juror in any court
of the United States upon any inquiry, hearing, or trial of any suit, proceeding, or prosecution based upon or arising under the provisions of this
act who shall, in the judgment of the court, be in complicity with any
such combination or conspiracy; and every such juror shall, before entering
upon any such inquiry, hearing, or trial, take and subscribe an oath in open
court that he has never, directly or indirectly, counseled, advised, or voluntarily aided any such combination or conspiracy; and each and every person
who shall take this oath, and shall therein swear falsely, shall be guilty of
perjury, and shall be subject to the pains and penalties declared against
that crime, and the first section of the act entitled "An act defining additional causes of challenge and prescribing an additional oath for grand and
petit jurors in the United States courts," approved June seventeenth,
eighteen hundred and sixty-two, be, and the same is hereby, repealed.
SEC. 6. That any person or persons, having mowledge that any of the
-wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the second section of this
act are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable to the person
injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by any such
wrongful act which such first-named person or persons by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an
action on the case in the proper circuit court of the United States, and any
number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined
as defendants in such action: Provided That such action shall be commenced within one year after such cause of action shall have accrued; and
if the death of any person shall be caused by any such wrongful act and
neglect, the legal representatives of such deceased person shall have such
action therefor, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of such deceased person, if any
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target of the legislation was the Ku Klux Klan,' 6 the overall scope
of the Act was much broader. The debates show that Congress was
not only concerned with punishing those who violated others' constitutional rights; the Act also was intended to remedy the failure
of state officials to apprehend, and the inability or unwillingness of
some Southern courts to convict and sentence, such offenders. 17 It
was for these reasons that Congress provided a federal forum for
18
civil and criminal actions under the Act.
The 1871 Civil Rights Act, encompassing section 1983, reflected a shift in American perceptions of the dangers of abuse of
governmental power. The Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 to
protect citizens from potential excesses of a strong federal government. 19 The Reconstruction Era evidenced a new concern-that
the states would not afford all citizens the fundamental human rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Congress responded to this new fear,
premising "[t]he legislative program of the post-Civil War days...
on the belief that the fundamental rights of the individual should
be defined and enforced by the federal government." 20
The language of section 1983 does not on its face establish any
standard of conduct requirement. It is reasonable to conclude that
there be, or if there be no widow, for the benefit of the next of kin of
such deceased person.
SEc. 7. That nothing herein contained shall be construed to supersede or repeal any former act or law except so far as the same may be
repugnant thereto; and any offenses heretofore committed against the tenor
of any former act shall be prosecuted, and any proceeding already commenced for the prosecution thereof shall be continued and completed, the
same as if this act had not been passed, except so far as the provisions of
this act may go to sustain and validate such proceedings.
APPROVED, April 20, 1871.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 335-36 (1871).
16 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is often referred to as the "Ku Klux Klan Act."
Despite the enactment of the fourteenth amendment and the passage of a civil rights

CONG.

statute in 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1870), conditions in much of the South operated

to deprive blacks of their newly-acquired rights, and similarly infringed upon the
rights of whites viewed as anti-slavery sympathizers. For discussions of Ku Klux
Klan outrages, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 155-60, 320-22, 487
(1871); id. app. 15-26, 29-40.
17See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1871)

(remarks of Rep.
Pratt); id. 506 (remarks of Rep. Pratt) (1871). See also Note, Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1154 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism]. "A full reading of the debates compels the conclusion that the Act was aimed at least as much at the abdication of law
enforcement responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at the Klan's outrages."

Id.
18

See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1871)

(remarks of Rep.

Stoughton); id. 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. 504 (remarks of Rep. Pratt).

19 See generally C. RossrrER, 1787 THE GnAius

2

0

CoNvEm

oN 302-03 (1966).

Gresman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L.

R v. 1323, 1357 (1952).
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Congress did not intend to impose any such requirements, because
the activities the statute was specifically enacted to prevent resulted
in large part from the neglect of law enforcement duties by
southern officials. This conclusion is buttressed by an examination
of the legislative history of the statute and the state of tort law in
1871. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Monell v. New York
City Department of Social Services 2 1 demonstrates the validity and
importance of the legislative history of section 1983 to judicial inter22
pretation of the statute.
A. Legislative History
1. The Debates
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed only one month after
then President Grant requested emergency legislation to deal with
incipient anarchy in parts of the South. 23 During that month,
however, Congress heatedly debated the bill. The debates focused
on the more radical provisions of the Act, which granted the President special powers, including authorization to send federal troops
into a state to ensure the protection of lives and property. Section
1, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was the least controversial part
of the legislation, but as Justice Douglas pointed out in Monroe v.
Pape,24 enough discussion took place with respect to section 1 to
ascertain that
one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
21436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22

Monell overruled the holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that a
municipal corporation is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976). In so doing, the Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of § 1983. 436 U.S. at 683-89.
23
In pertinent part the President's message read:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the States of the Union rendering life and property insecure, and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of
affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the power
to correct these evils is beyond the control of the State authorities I do not
doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within
the limits of existing law, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear.
Therefore I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of
Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
The President's message was deCONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871).
livered on March 23, 1871; the Civil Eights Act of 1871 was enacted on April 20,
1871.
24365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Monroe Court examined the legislative history of
§ 1983 in arriving at its decision. For a more extended discussion of Monroe v.
Pape, see notes 61-72 infra & accompanying text.
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passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies. 25
Vehement objections to section 1 were voiced by several members of both the House and the Senate. The thrust of these objections was expressed by one speaker who charged:
The first section of the bill . . .vests in the Federal

courts jurisdiction to determine the individual rights of
citizens of the same State; a jurisdiction which of right belongs only to the State tribunals, and to rob them of it by
the power of the Federal Government is an infraction of
the Constitution so flagrant that the people will hold to a
strict accountability those men and that party who per26
petrate the outrage.

In spite of such objections, the views of another speaker prevailed:
Congress has power to legislate for the protection of every
American citizen in the full, free, and undisturbed enjoyment of every right, privilege, or immunity secured to him
by the Constitution; and . . . this may be done . . . [b]y

States courts for
giving him a civil remedy in the United
27
regard.
that
in
sustained
any damage
These statements indicate that a broad remedy was intended,
as both factions understood. The intended breadth of the Statute
is further evidenced by the following statement by a supporter of
the bill:
This section of this bill, on the same state of facts, not only
provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition
may have been that of slaves, but also to all people where,
under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their national citizen28
ship.
25 365 U.S. at 180. It is also important to note that Monell carefully analyzed
the legislative history of § 1 of the 1871 Act, despite the relative paucity of debate.
436 U.S. 658, 683-89 (1978). See note 22 supra.
2
6 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1871) (remarks of Rep. McHenry).
27 Id. 477 (remarks of Rep. Dawes) (emphasis added).
28 Id. app. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
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The speeches of several debaters support the idea that section 1 provided a remedy for constitutional deprivations caused by
negligent as well as by reckless or intentional conduct. In the
words of an opponent, law enforcement officials could be held liable
"for a mere error in judgment." 29 even though "as pure in duty
as a saint and as immaculate as a seraph." 30 Senator Thurman,
perhaps the most vocal opponent of the 1871 Act's civil liability
provision, warned:
It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution
of the United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts, and that without any limit
whatsoever as to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five
dollars or even five cents; they may be what lawyers call
merely nominal damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal courts ....31
This interpretation is not merely an example of the hyperactive imaginations of the Bill's detractors. In the words of a supporter:
Whatever they be, he . . . who invades, trenches upon,
or impairs one iota or tittle of the least of them, to that
extent trenches upon the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and this Constitution authorizes us to bring
him before the courts to answer therefor. That covers...
all there is in the first and second sections of this bill.32
Moreover, there is no reason to read into the statute limitations
that do not appear on its face.3 3 In the words of one of the debaters,
the legislation was "neither defined nor specific, thus leaving the widest latitude to those who may be called on to execute it." 34 Senator
Thurman remarked: "there is no limitation whatsoever upon the
29Id.

365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur) (emphasis added).

so ld.
31 Id. app. 216 (emphasis added).
32 Id. 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes).
33
Mention was made in the debates of the need to construe the language of
§ I liberally. Id. app. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, quoting 1 J.SToRY, COMMENTABIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 429 (1833)); see Monell
v. Department of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 683-86 (1978).
34 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Swann).
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terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can
be used." 35 Finally, Mr. Dawes, a strong supporter of the bill, expressed his view of the legislation as follows:
The rights, privileges, and immunities of the American
citizen, secured to him under the Constitution of the
United States, are the subject-matter of this bill. They
are not defined in it, and there is no attempt in it to put
limitations upon any of them; but whatever they are, however broad or important, however minute or small, however estimated by the American citizen himself, or by his
Legislature, they are in this law.... No subject for legisislation was ever brought before the American Congress
so broad and comprehensive.... 36
It has been suggested that even if section 1983 does permit
actions based on negligence, it was intended only to apply to spe37
It is
cial circumstances, primarily involving rights of blacks.
undeniable that the legislation was prompted by the special situation of the blacks in the South, but it is unnecessary to seek contemporary analogs38 to justify using section 1983 to its fullest
extent. None of the other civil rights amendments or statutes have
been so interpreted, and none of the courts dealing with section
1983 to date have felt so constrained. One positive factor noted
by one of the Act's opponents was articulated as follows: "[T]here
39 A
is one good feature in this bill; that is, it applies to all ....
supporter stated: "I would legislate to meet apprehended as well as
existing conditions. I would make a law applicable alike to every
part of the country and to be permanently upon the statute-book." 40
In summary, the legislative history of section 1983 demonstrates that the statute was intended to provide a far-reaching remedy for all deprivations of federally protected rights. The language
of the debates indicates that negligent acts or omissions resulting in
constitutional deprivations were considered sufficient to subject
state officials to liability.
".

app. 217 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
a Id. 475.
351d.

37 See Shapo, supra note 10, at 320-29; Section 1983 and Federalism, supra
note 17, at 1137.
38 See id. 1137.
39

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1871)

40

Id.

See also text accompanying note 28 supra.

(remarks of Rep. Harris).
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2. Tort Law in 1871
The conclusions reached above are strengthened by the fact that
negligence was a commonly known element of tort law when the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed.
Negligence, both as an element of specific types of tortious
conduct and as an independent tort, achieved full recognition as
early as 1825.41 By 1871, numerous cases held persons liable in civil
actions based on negligent misconduct-both for affirmative acts and
for omissions. 42 A cause of action against holders of public office
dates back to a much earlier period.43 One of the oldest forms of
negligence liability was the liability "of those who professed competence in certain callings."44 The doctrine achieved full bloom
in Blackstone's Commentaries.45 It was "stated in terms that [made]
everyone who profess[ed] a common calling liable for neglect,
whether by act or omission." 41 Included among those considered
to have a "common calling" were sheriffs and other holders of public office. 47 Blackstone specifically addressed the question of official
negligence in his treatment of "public wrongs" in volume four of
the Commentaries.4 8 The rule set forth reads as follows: "[T]he
negligence of public officers intrusted with the administration of
justice, as sheriffs, coroners, constables, and the like .... makes the
offender liable to be fined; and in very notorious cases will lead
to a forfeiture of his office, if it be a beneficial one . .

.-

9

This traditional liability of sheriffs and other public officials for
negligent acts or omissions strengthens the proposition that Congress intended to extend civil liability under the first section of the
1871 Act for negligence. Many of the legislators had legal train4

1See Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAw Q. Rv.
184, 195 (1926).
42Id. 199-201. The existence of a tort cause of action for negligence was dealt
with in considerable detail in F.

HuLIAD, THE LAw OF ToTs oR PRIVATE WRONGS

124-30 (1859), an early textbook on American tort law published in 1859, 12 years
before the enactment of the original version of § 1983.
431d. 189-90.

44Id. 185.
453 W. BLAcEsToNE, ComiNTAiuEs *164, cited in Winfield, supra note 41,
at 189.
46 Winfield, supra note 41, at 189.
W. BLACsTONE, supra note 45, at *164.
4 W. BLAcSTONE, Comm, rAmms *140.
49Id. (emphasis in original). In a related footnote Blackstone stated: "A judge
is not indictable for an error in judgment; but this rule extends only to judges in
courts of record and not to -inisterial officers." Id. n.70 (quoting W.O. RussELT,
A TEATSE ON CRIMs AND MISDEmEANORS *200).
47 3
48
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ing 50 and presumably were fully aware of the legal significance of
what they were doing; Blackstone was cited as authority several
times during the course of the debates."' Once again, the logic of
a straightforward reading of the statute is apparent: Congress did
not include a standard of conduct requirement in the statute because it did not intend to foreclose actions based on negligence.
Given this analysis of the legislative history of section 1983, it is
important to examine how courts have interpreted the statute.
B. Judicial Interpretationof Section 1983
1. The First Ninety Years
Although there were some exceptions, 52 the initial chapter of
section 1983's judicial history was characterized by decisions that
interpreted the language of the statute very narrowly, thereby severely limiting the scope of its application. These decisions evidenced a return by the federal judiciary to a protective attitude
toward states' rights, 53 an outlook clearly at variance with the belief of the statute's drafters that the time had come for the federal
government to protect the civil rights of all Americans.
The two principal limitations imposed by the courts were accomplished through restrictive interpretations of the scope of the
protections offered by the fourteenth amendment and the meaning
of the "under color of law" language of section 1983. The
Slaughterhouse Cases 54 "limited the interests protected by the
amendment to only those rights correlative with the existence of
national government, effectively excluding almost all civil rights
from its purview." 55 A series of cases interpreting the phrase "un50

The Senate in 1871, for example, had 72 members. Through the combined
use of the Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, BiocRApmcA.
DmEcToRY OF =l. AmE ucAN CoNcREss 1774-1951, at 196-200 (U.S.G.P.O. 1963),
and Who Was Who in America 1607-1896, MARQtrs-Wsso's WHO INc., WHO WAS
WHO IN AmEmIcA 1607-1896 (1963), it was possible to ascertain that at least 34 of
the 59 senators for whom biographical sketches were available were lawyers.
51 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 92 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. Duke); id. 821 (remarks of Sen. Sherman). Although the debaters cited
Blackstone primarily as authority supporting sections of the Act other than § 1, these
references demonstrate that Blackstone was a familiar and respected legal authority
in 1871.
52

See, e.g., the white primary cases: Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)
overruled, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
See also Hague v. CIO, 307
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
U.S. 496 (1939) (labor organizers sought court order against harassment by city
officials acting pursuant to a local ordinance).

53 See Section 1983 and Federalism,supra note 17, at 1156-57.
5483 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

55 Section 1983 and Federalism,supra note 17, at 1157 (footnotes omitted).
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der color of law" held that conduct by state officials in excess of
their authority was not within the statute. "Thus, that very lawlessness of government agents the prevention of which had been the
primary object of the Act of 1871 was immunized from federal
sanction." "( It is significant, however, that, even during this period of judicially-imposed limitations upon section 1983, there were
no decisions restricting the statute's reach through the imposition of
standard of conduct requirements.
In the 1940's these court-erected barriers began to fall. In
United States v. Classic,5 7 the Supreme Court held that "[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law ... is action taken 'under

color of' state law." 58 In Screws v. United States,59 the Court reaffirmed this interpretation, stating, "[a]cts of officers who undertake
to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to
the line of their authority or overstep it." 60 Although both Classic
and Screws were cases brought pursuant to the criminal liability
provisions of the 1871 Act, this new interpretation of "under color
of" state law set the stage for the reemergence of section 1983 as a
means for obtaining civil redress of deprivations of civil rights.
The gradual incorporation of various of the guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment began shortly
thereafter, thereby expanding the protections to which citizens of
the several states were entitled under the federal constitution.
2. Monroe v. Pape
In 1961, ninety years after the original language of the statute
was enacted, the modern phase of litigation under section 1983 began
with the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape.6 ' The
Monroe plaintiffs were six black children and their parents who
brought a section 1983 suit alleging violations of their fourth amend56 Id. 1160-61; see id. 1160 n.138.
57313 U.S. 299 (1941).

Id. 326.
59 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
58

60 Id. 111. In dictum, Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe fact that a prisoner is
assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does not necessarily mean that
he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States." Id. 108-09. This language is dictum, and at any rate, when it was
written the eighth amendment had not yet been incorporated into the fourteenth.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Thus, although a state prior to
incorporation had certain obligations to prisoners under the due process clause, it is
conceivable that activities that were clear violations of the provision against cruel and

unusual punishment would not have violated a state's due process duty to its
prisoners. See text accompanying notes 113-26 infra.
61365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv.

of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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ment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.6 2
The defendants were the City of Chicago and thirteen police officers.
The Court partially limited the scope of section 1983 by holding
that the City was not a "person" within the meaning of the statute 63
and therefore was not subject to suit, because "Congress did not
undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of
[section 1983]."64 This particular holding, however, has since been
overruled. 65
An element of the decision that was far more significant in expanding the applicability of section 1983, and that is particularly
relevant to this inquiry into possible statutorily-mandated standards of conduct, was the Court's ruling that the plaintiffs had a valid
cause of action against the defendant police officers. The Court
based this decision on a reaffirmance of the Classic and Screws definition of "under color of" state law, 66 and on the finding that the
legislative history of section 1983 showed that plaintiffs were not
barred from bringing suit under the federal statute merely because
67
state law afforded them an adequate remedy.
This disregard of the adequate state remedy requirement
sparked a great deal of controversy. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, supported this conclusion by stating: "It is no answer that
the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 68
6

12 The plaintiffs alleged that

13 Chicago police officers broke into [their] home in the early morning,
routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room, and
ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers.
[They] further allege[d] that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police
station and detained on 'open' charges for 10 hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder, that he was not taken before a
magistrate, though one was accessible, that he was not permitted to call his
family or attorney, that he was subsequently released without criminal
charges being preferred against him.
365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
63
In later years the lower federal courts extended this exclusion to states and

institutions controlled by state and local governments.
64 365 U.S. at 187.
65 The Monroe limitation of the definition of a "person" under § 1983 was overruled in the Court's recent decision in Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

See note 22 supra.

66365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961).
67 Id. 183.
68 Id. It is now well settled that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to §1983 actions. See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at 1264
& n.1. For a general discussion of exhaustion, see id. 1264-74.
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The most significant language in Monroe, in terms of resolving
the question of what standards of conduct are required by the statute, was Justice Douglas' description of the federal remedy provided by section 1983:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed
criminal penalties for acts "wilfully" done. We construed
that word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with
"a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."
S.. We do not think that gloss should be placed on [section 1983] which we have here. The word "wilfully" does
not appear in [section 1983]. Moreover, [section 1983]
provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt
with a criminal law. . ... Section [1983] should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.69
Some lower courts have given this language an extremely narrow reading, saying that it means only that section 1983 does not
require specific intent to deprive an individual of his constitutional
rights.70 Such an interpretation ignores the breadth of the emphasized language: "liability for the natural consequences of [one's]
actions" 71 encompasses more than a lack of specific intent. Critics
of this more straightforward reading argue that such a broad interpretation is incompatible with a federal system. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Monroe provides an effective response to this
argument. Justice Harlan stated:
One can agree ...that Congress had no intention of taking over the whole field of ordinary state torts... without
being certain that the enacting Congress would not have
regarded actions by an official, made possible by his position, as far more serious than an ordinary state tort, and
therefore as a matter of federal concern.7 2
3. After Monroe: The Search for a Standard
In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe
v. Pape, the lower federal courts generally applied the opinion's
language broadly. 73 Many agreed with the view that:
609d. 187 (emphasis
7

added).

oSee, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970).
71 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
72 Id. 193 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73 See Shapo, supra note 10, at 297-319.
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The Act prescribes two elements for recovery: (1) the conduct complained of must have been done by some person
acting under color of law; and (2) such conduct must have
subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 74
A few lower courts expressed misgivings about allowing section
1983 actions based on negligent, rather than intentional or reckless,
misconduct. 75 Some took pains to find that the facts of particular
cases evidenced more than "simple negligence," 71while others simply
held that negligence alone would not suffice under the statute,
despite proof of constitutional deprivations. 77 Some of these courts
expressed the fear that allowing actions for constitutional deprivations resulting from official negligence would convert section 1983
into a federal torts statute that would thereby infringe upon state
power. 78 These decisions ignore the plan meaning of the language
See also, e.g.,
74Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972).
Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub noa. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Kish v. Milwaukee, 441 F.2d
901, 904 (7th Cir. 1971); Batista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1965); Stringer
v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1963); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639,
649 (9th Cir. 1962). Cf. Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1972)
("[Ilt is incorrect as a general rule . . . to state that the negligent conduct of a
person acting under color of state law cannot be the basis for relief under § 1983.");
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (defendants held
"subject to suit under § 1983 for any negligent breach of duty that may have caused
appellant to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights").
75 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (1st Cir. 1974); Brown
v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973).
76 See, e.g., Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 556 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 838 (1974); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).
77
See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 932 (1978); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974);
Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016
(1970); Vun Cannon v. Breed, 391 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
78
Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978), provides an example. The case involved a § 1983 claim based on the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The majority opinion relied heavily
on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), but instead of deciding the case on grounds
of the due process clause alone as in Paul, the circuit court ruled on the suffciiency
of negligence under § 1983. In Paul, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had
not established a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee. He could not rely on
the fourteenth amendment as a general federal tort law absent the showing of such
a deprivation. The Bonner majority not only held that the plaintiff in that case had
not established the violation of a constitutional right, but that negligent conduct is
"not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of rights under Section 1983."
545 F.2d at 567. To allow § 1983 actions based on negligence, the court stated,
would cause federal courts to "be inundated with state tort cases." Id. 568. Dissenting Judge Swygert pointed out the fallacies of this conclusion. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
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of section 1983 and Justice Douglas' language in Monroe v. Pape,79
as well as the logic of Justice Harlan's distinction between ordinary
torts and official torts resulting in the deprivation of constitutionallyprotected rights.8 0
The confusion that subsequently developed over the sufficiency
of negligence to support a section 1983 action was due in part to
the failure of many courts to articulate clearly whether decisions in
section 1983 cases were based on statutory or constitutional interpretations. In some cases, however, the courts recognized that the
question whether negligence is sufficient to state a cause of action
under section 1983 is distinct and separable from the question
whether negligence is sufficient to state a cause of action under the
particular constitutional guarantee that has allegedly been violated.
The legislative history demonstrates that this is clearly the best mode
of analysis. These latter opinions evidenced judicial comprehension of the complexity of the two issues and a careful framework
of analysis, properly concluding that section 1983 does not preclude
actions based on allegations of official negligence. For example, in
Navarette v. Enomoto,8s the Ninth Circuit made it clear that secdon 1983 was not to be interpreted to impose any general standard
of conduct. In so doing the court stated a rule that this Comment
concludes is appropriate for all section 1983 cases: "A 1983 plaintiff
must show that he has been deprived of a federally protected right
by reason of official conduct." 82 Once a constitutional deprivation is established, "the plaintiff's allegations that state officials negligently deprived him of those rights state a cause of action." 83 This
same notion was expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Carterv. Carlson:84 "[A state official is] subject to suit under § 1983
79

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see note 69 supra & accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit has pointed out that "constricting the possibility of
recovery under section 1983 is consistent with neither the plain language of the act
nor the mandate to read it 'against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.'" Jenkins v. Averett, 424
F.2d 1228, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187

(1961)).
80365 U.S. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring); see text accompanying note 72
supra.
81536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
82536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976).
83 Id. 282. The court also stated that § 1983 "places no narrow limitation on
the nature or quality of the conduct which makes it actionable, but concerns itself
entirely with the consequences of that conduct." Id. 281.
84447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), re'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).

552

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:533

for any negligent breach of duty that may have caused [the plaintiff]
to be subject to a deprivation of constitutional rights." 85
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v.
Gamble,"" an eighth amendment medical mistreatment case brought
pursuant to section 1983, has been interpreted by a few lower courts
to require a section 1983 plaintiff to allege more than mere negligence. 7 As discussed more fully in section IV, infra, Estelle was
decided on eighth amendment, rather than statutory, grounds. The
validity of this conclusion is apparent in the Supreme Court's grant
of certiorari during the succeeding term to decide the specific question of the sufficiency of negligence to support a cause of action
under section 1983.8 This case, Procunier v. Navarette, however,
did not resolve the issue, because it was decided on immunity
grounds.8 9
The case law demonstrates that courts have not resolved the
question of the sufficiency of allegations of negligence to state a cause
of action under section 1983. The better view is that the statute
imposes no general standard of conduct requirement; 10 the suf85 447 F.2d at 365. See also Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. I11
1967):
It is clear, therefore, that section 1983 has been interpreted to provide a
new type of tort: the invasion, under color of law, of a citizen's constitutional rights. It is also clear that it is not necessary that this invasion be
intentional; it may be merely negligent . . . . Where the defendant is
under some affirmative duty to act and he fails to act accordingly, he may
be held negligently responsible for his omission. He is responsible if his
omission is unreasonable in light of the circumstances.
Id. 872. Compare these cases with those cited in note 90 infra.
86 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
s 7 See, e.g., Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
974 (1977); Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864
(1977); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
A better analysis is found in Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d
1077 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit used the Estelle standard properly---4.e.,
to determine whether a constitutional violation could have been established by the
complaint's allegations.
It is possible that the court in Gamble v. Estelle, the remand of Estelle v.
Gamble, might have reached the same decision under a properly applied constitutional analysis. The distinction between a statutory and constitutional analysis,
however, could affect the decision in other cases.
8
8 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). For the text of the question
certified, see note 8 supra.
89 See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
90 Many courts have held negligence actionable under § 1983, although some
have subsequently held otherwise. See text accompanying notes 184-209 infra. For
cases holding negligence sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983, see, e.g.,
Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) ("plaintiff's allegations that
state officials negligently deprived him of [constitutional] rights state a cause of
action"); Byrd v. Briske, 466 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1972); Roberts v. Williams, 456
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ficiency of negligence should turn on the nature of the particular
constitutional guarantee in question. Those courts that have held
otherwise have misread Monroe v. Pape., and, more importantly,
have ignored the legislative history of the statute.
C. Policy Considerations with Respect to Section 1983
Negligence Actions
Several policy reasons have been suggested in support of a narrow reading of section 1983. One commonly asserted justification
is the need to reduce the federal courts' caseload. This is hardly
a viable argument, however. There is no guarantee that elimination of negligence as a foundation for section 1983 claims would
have a significant effect on the caseload. The result, for example,
might well be a simple terminology change, at least in the initial
complaint stage. 9 1 A more important consideration in opposition
to the goal of judicial economy has been pointed out by Judge
Swygert of the Seventh Circuit:
F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1972); Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir. 1972);
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d
781, 787-89 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Joseph v. Rowlen,
402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1968); Doe v. Swinson, No. 76-91-A (E.D. Va., filed
Nov. 24, 1976), vacated, Dec. 22, 1976 (case dismissed upon settlement of $20,000
to be paid by defendant sheriff's indemnifier); Moon v. Winfield, 368 F. Supp. 843,
844 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
91 The decision whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed with a § 1983 action
based on official negligence is often made in response to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, FED. R. CrV. P. 12(b) (6),
or a motion for summary judgment, id. 56(c). If the Supreme Court were to hold
negligence insufficient and adopt a standard such as deliberate indifference, see text
accompanying notes 86-88 supra, for all § 1983 cases, it is likely that the result
would be a simple change in terminology.
It is unlikely that courts would often be able to apply this fine legal distinction
to ascertain either that the facts alleged did not state a cause of action, see FED. R.
Crv. P. 12(b)(6), or that no genuine issue of material fact existed, see id. 56(c).
But see Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974
(1977). This determination would be even more difficult in pro se cases, which
account for a substantial part of federal litigation, particularly in prisoner cases.
See Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in
the Federal Courts, in PnsoNER's PicnTs (M. Hoft & M. Hermann eds. 1972). "As
the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 . . . a pro se complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' . . . ." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976).
If judicial economy is the goal, an equally unappealing but much more effective
way of achieving it would be to change the in forma pauperis rules, see note 1
supra. See also Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits, supra note 1, at
119-22. Without the ability to proceed in forma pauperis many prisoners and other
indigents would be unable to bring suit. Id. 116 (citing Bailey, The Realities of
Prisoners'Cases Under 42 U.S.C. f 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District
of Illinois, 6 Loy. Cm. L.J. 527, 530 (1975).
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The distinction between negligence and intentional conduct

. .

has no explanatory power either in determining

whether the plaintiff's interest which he alleges has been
infringed is protected under the Constitution or whether
the defendants' conduct is action under color of state law.
It is relied upon.., to prevent the inundation of the federal courts with state tort claims. There can be no question but that it performs that task admirably. The same
function would be served, however, by rejecting every section 1983 case brought by plaintiffs with last names beginning with letters that come after "K" in the alphabet.
Mere efficiency is not enough to justify a dichotomy that
screens out cases which are obviously within the ambit of
the injuries for which Congress intended to provide a
remedy in section 1983.92

Judge Swygert's position is well taken. Not only is judicial
economy an improper motive for restricting the scope of a congressionally-created remedy, but excluding negligence claims from
section 1983 actions does not prevent the statute from serving as a
federal torts law. Generally, "[i]ncluded under the head of torts
are a miscellaneous group of civil wrongs, ranging from simple,
direct interferences with the person .

.

. up through various forms

of negligence." 11 Therefore, even if negligent acts or omissions are
excluded from its purview, section 1983 will still serve as a federal
torts statute. There is no rational, principled basis for excluding
negligence actions alone.
The contention that negligence actions should be the exclusive
domain of the state courts is equally unacceptable. This federalism
question was debated in Congress in 187 1.9 The issue is the acceptability of the federal regulation of any type of conduct of state
92
Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 932 (1978) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
93 W. PROSSEP, LAW OF TORTS 2-3 (4th ed. 1971).
94
Most of the objections voiced by the debators in the House and Senate concerned §§ 2-4 of the 1871 Civil Bights Act. Section 2 imposed criminal penalties
for conspiracy to violate civil rights and other related crimes; section 3 authorized
the President to send the militia and/or federal troops to protect the lives and
property of citizens whenever he deemed a state unable or unwilling to defend the
civil rights of its residents; and § 4 authorized the President to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus in emergency situations involving violence and widespread infringement of federally protected rights. For the text of the Act, see note 15 supra. See
also Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 664-66 (1978).
Some objections to the constitutionality of § 1 of the Act were raised, see, e.g., CoNG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Archer); id. app. 215
(remarks of Rep. Johnston), but the arguments in favor of § 1 prevailed, see, e.g.,
id. 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes); id. (remarks of Rep. Cook); id. 501 (remarks of
Rep. Frelinghuysen); id. app. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
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officials. The majority of the members of both Houses of Congress
found that the danger that fundamental rights would not be protected in the absence of the legislation was compelling enough to
overcome objections based on principles of federalism. It is not
for the courts to overrule this decision by resurrecting the argument
to support an ultimately artificial distinction among types of constitutional torts. The key, as Justice Harlan noted in 1961,15 is that
Congress perceived something special about tortious conduct resulting in the deprivation of a federally protected right. The infringement on state jurisdiction resulting from permitting tort suits to
be brought in the federal courts is outweighed, therefore, by the
need to provide an unquestionably impartial forum in which to
litigate the denial of constitutional rights. 96
One argument offered for excluding negligence from section
1983 is that intentional or reckless conduct does more violence to
the Constitution than does negligent misconduct; the intentional infringement of another's constitutional rights is a greater attack
upon the particular constitutional guarantee, and, as such, is entided to greater protection than a negligent infringement of that
same right.9 7 Although this is a more viable argument than either
judicial efficiency or federalism, it is not convincing. The debates
reveal that the primary focus of concern in the enactment of what
9
5 See
96

text accompanying note 72 supra.
Protection against the violation of constitutional rights by public officials is
particularly important:
Any misuse of public authority threatens the equilibrium of a system resting so fundamentally on the consent of the governed, but the threat is most
acute when the misconduct injures a citizen directly--especially if it denies
him a constitutionally protected right.
Nowhere is this threat more dangerous than in the administration of
criminal justice, where large numbers of society's least powerful members
confront awesome governmental power. The unlawful arrest, the unjustified
search, the prosecution based on evidence known to be false, the mistreatment by a jailer-all victimize the most vulnerable of the citizenry. Their
individual liberty, privacy, and physical well-being are the initial casualties.
Ultimately, such injuries threaten the vitality of a system of ordered liberty.
Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
97
See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 10, at 326-27. Shapo suggests that the increased
use of § 1983 as a basis for civil rights suits has led to "the development of a federal
common law without a correspondingly compelling federal interest." Id. It is difficult to understand why the federal government has no compelling interest in securing the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Indeed, one of the primary functions of a federal government should be to enforce
federal rights. In the words of Representative Perry, responding to similar objections in 1871: "It is clear that rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States are proper subjects for the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts. It appears to me so clear that I must ask pardon for having argued
it." CoNG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 79 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Perry).
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is now section 1983 was the harm, however incurred, to the individuals whose rights were violated, not any conception of the damage done to the Constitution by those who deliberately ignored its
precepts. 98
Another fallacious argument offered against holding negligence
actionable under section 1983 is that the possibility of incurring
negligence liability will deter qualified, competent persons from
holding state office or being employed by the state. As long as one
takes reasonable steps to ensure that he fulfills the duties inherent
in his position he need not fear liability. Before a state official can
be held liable, negligence must be shown; presumably competent
individuals will seldom unreasonably deprive others of constitutional rights. Moreover, federal immunity doctrines 99 protect state
98

See text accompanying notes 23-40 supra.
99 Since its decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme
Court has ruled in several cases that the immunities available to governmental
officials at common law are available in § 1983 actions. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967), the Court held that police officers were entitled to a "good faith and
probable cause" defense, id. 556, in § 1983 actions. This defense, however, gave rise
to a qualified rather than an absolute immunity from suit. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974), extended this defense to high state executive officials, but, as in
Pierson, the Court declined to hold these officials absolutely immune, stating that,
"in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch
of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion, and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at
the time of the action." Id. 247.
Finally, in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court held that school
administrators were entitled to the same type of qualified immunity. This immunity
from § 1983 damages would be lost only if the official "knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the [person] affected, or if he took the action with
the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury."
Id. 322. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Last term the Supreme Court applied the standards developed in Pierson,
Scheuer, and Wood to prison administrators in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978), a case involving an alleged deprivation of a prisoner's first and fourteenth
amendment right to freedom from interference with his outgoing mail. Although
certiorari was granted to resolve the question whether allegations of negligent deprivations of constitutional rights are actionable under § 1983, see note 8 supra, the
Court based its decision on immunity grounds, finding that at the time of the alleged
deprivation "there was no 'clearly established' First and Fourteenth Amendment
right with respect to the correspondence of convicted prisoners." 434 U.S. at 565.
The Court held that "[als a matter of law, therefore, there was no basis for rejecting
the immunity defense on the ground that petitioners [state officials] knew or should
have known that their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. Chief
Justice Burger dissented in an opinion stating that the Court should have decided
the negligence question. Id. 567-68 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also
dissented, but for a different reason. He argued that the Court "acted unwisely in
reaching out to decide the merits of an affirmative defense before any evidence [had]
been heard." Id. 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Previously, immunity had been
viewed as an issue for the jury. See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17,
at 1211 n.126.
For an overall review of developments in federal immunities law to date, see
Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978); Freed, Executive Official Immunity for
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officials in instances where the constitutional right in question is not
clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. As the
Supreme Court recently decided in Procunier v. Navarette,0 0 there
is no cause of action for negligence when the official could not have
known of the existence of the right. Thus, recovery for negligent
misconduct is possible only in cases of neglect of duties related to
clearly established constitutional rights. An individual who is not
willing to assume responsibility for violating clearly established
constitutional rights is hardly a desirable public servant. As the
Second Circuit expressed so aptly in Wright v. McMann: 101
We are not moved by the suggestion that if we uphold liability today competent persons tomorrow will refuse to
become superintendents, as the title is presently designated. In the unlikely event that a prospective superintendent in fact turns down an offer for fear of personal
liability, we think that the position is probably better filled
by someone determined to supervise the facility so as to
prevent the type of inmate treatment giving rise to this
102
lawsuit.
All of the previously advanced policy reasons for limiting the
scope of section 1983 are in conflict with the intended purposes of
the statute. As the Supreme Court noted in Monell v. Department
of Social Services of New York, 10 3 Representative Shellabarger
made the following statement with respect to section 1983:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally
ConstitutionalViolations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rnv. 526 (1977).
It should be noted that the question whether the defendants are immune from damages is separable from the question whether negligence is sufficient to support a
cause of action in a § 1983 suit. In Navarette, both Justice White, writing for the
majority, and Justice Stevens, dissenting, assumed without deciding that negligent
misconduct violates § 1983. 434 U.S. at 569 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see
Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978). In Bogard the plaintiff's ability to
sue the defendant officials depended on the second prong of the Wood test, because
the law was unclear at the time of the alleged constitutional deprivation. The court
held that, with respect to this subjective standard, "Navarette squarely establishes
that proof of simple negligence is not enough to pierce an official's immunity under
§ 1983." Id. 411.
100434 U.S. 555 (1978).
101460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972).
202 Id. 136. A supervisor's potential liability is further limited by the lack of
respondeat superior in § 1983 actions. A supervisor can only be held liable for his
own negligence; he is not responsible for the negligence of those he supervises. See
Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at 1207.
103 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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and beneficently construed. It would be most strange
and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of
interpretation. As has been again and again decided by
your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the
largest latitude consistent with the words employed is
uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and
give remedies for their wrongs to all the people ....
Chief Justice Jay and also Story say:
"Where a power is remedial in its nature there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation
of laws."-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429.104
This is the spirit in which the statute should be interpreted.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD:

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The preceding section of this Comment has argued that section 1983 imposes no general standard of conduct requirement.
Given this conclusion, the actionability of claims based on official
negligence must turn on the nature of the particular constitutional
guarantee in question and on the character of the deprivation. It
is therefore appropriate to consider whether a standard of conduct
is incorporated within the eighth amendment.
The eighth amendment, the origins of which can be traced to
the Magna Carta, 1 5 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 101 The ban on cruel and unusual punishments was intended by the original English drafters as a prohibition of disproportionate punishments, but was originally interpreted in America
as a prohibition of cruel methods of punishment.- 7 This restric104Id. 683-86 (quoting CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Shellbarger)).
105 The Magna Carta included provisions against excessive amercements, which
were arbitrary fines imposed in lieu of punishment for many crimes. Generally,
only death and outlawry were not amerceable. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rrv. 839, 845 (1969).
106 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
207 See Granucci, supra note 105, at 860.

The language of the eighth amend-

ment is directly descended from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which responded
to demands for proportionality of punishment to the crime committed. Id. 852-60.
When first transported to the New World in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776, the language was interpreted as a prohibition against excessively cruel methods
of punishment. Id. 840-41. Similiar provisions were subsequently made in the Bills
of Rights of Maryland (1776), Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1783),
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tive view of the amendment's prohibitions was expanded by the
Supreme Court in the early twentieth century to include a prohibition of disproportionate punishments. In Weems v. United
States, 0 8 the Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense." 109 In determining what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment the Supreme Court has focused on the gravity of the
harm suffered. Chief Justice Warren stated in Trop v. Dulles 110 that
"[t]he amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society." 1I
It is difficult, however, to translate the notion of contemporary
standards of decency into a positive statement of what the eighth
amendment actually requires." 2 The amendment's deceptively
simple language conceals complex concepts that are not easily
grasped. Two such concepts-the constitutional duty imposed by
the eighth amendment and the sufficiency of an allegation of negligence to support a claim of violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment provision-are discussed below.
A. The Eighth Amendment Duty of Care
It was apparently assumed by the drafters of the Constitution
that the inherent powers of government included the punishment
of lawbreakers. 113 The framers of the Bill of Rights accepted the
existence of this power but sought to prevent its abuse by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments." 4 Clearly, imprisonment in
and of itself does not violate the eighth amendment prohibition.
North Carolina (1784), and Pennsylvania (1790), see 27 Am. U.L. REv. 92, 95
n.15 (1977), all showing a clear intent to prohibit cruel methods of punishment.

Interestingly, the prohibition against cruel methods of punishments had appeared much earlier in colonial history, in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
1641: "For bodily punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, barbarous or cruel." Granucci, supra note 105, at 851.
10s 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
209 Id. 367.
110 356 U.S. 86 (1957) (Warren, CJ., plurality opinion).
" Id. 101.
112 For a general explanation of a methodology for deciding what the eighth
amendment requires, see Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death: Evolving StandardsFor
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978). Radin's
discussion is basically concerned with the means of punishment and its proportionality. The focus of this Comment is on what Radin terms "nonjudicial discretion,"
id. 995, by which the eighth amendment places limits on "official discretion to carry
out otherwise permissible punishment." Id.
113 The power to punish appears several times in the Constitution. E.g., U.S.
art. 1, § 3, cl. 6; U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 6, 10; U.S. CoNsT. art. 3, § 3;
U.S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 2, cl. 2.
CONST.

114 See, C. Rossrrm%, supra note 17, at 226-27.
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The nature of incarceration as a punishment, however, makes it
necessary for the government to take affirmative steps to provide
basic necessities of life to those it imprisons. When the government denies fundamental essentials to prisoners, incarceration as a
form of punishment becomes cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court stated in Estelle v.
Gamble,1 5 "it is but just that the public be required to care for
the prisoner who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself."

11

The constitutional duty of the state to provide prison conditions comporting with fundamental human rights and contemporary
standards of human dignity was expressed by the Sixth Circuit as
follows:
An individual incarcerated, whether for a term of life for
for the commission of some heinous crime, or merely for
the night to "dry out" in the local drunk tank, becomes both
vulnerable and dependent upon the state to provide certain simple and basic human needs. Examples are food,
shelter, and sanitation. Facilities may be primitive but
they must be adequate. Medical care is another such
need. Denial of necessary medical attention may well result in disabilities beyond that contemplated by the incarceration itself. The result may be crippling injury
-

.

. [or] the very deprivation of life itself, since, restrained

by the authority of the state, the individual cannot himself
seek medical aid or provide the other necessities for sus1 17
taining life and health
Because of the inherent attributes of prison life, an affirmative
duty to provide adequate food, shelter, medicine, protection, and
other essentials to prisoners is a constitutional mandate implicit
in the eighth amendment. Thus in Wright v. Mci~lann,"8 the
Second Circuit recognized that even prisoners in segregation have
rights to adequate heat, light, and sanitation;

119

in Estelle v.

Gamble,)2"

the Supreme Court held that "the government [has an]
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing
":5 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
116 Id. 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291
(1926)).
117 Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Fitzke v. Shap-

pell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972)) (emphasis in original).
118 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
119 Id. 526.
120 429

U.S. 97 (1976).
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by incarceration"; 121 and in Woodhous v. Virginia,122 the Fourth
Circuit upheld the right of a prisoner "to be reasonably free from
constant threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates." 123 Many other decisions have similarly upheld the rights
of prisoners to such fundamental necessities. 124
It is thus well settled that the government has a constitutional
duty to provide for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. 12

i

When the government fails to fulfill this duty it violates the eighth
amendment.

12

B. Section 1983 Negligence Cases Prior to
Estelle v. Gamble
The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape 127 in 1961,
and the incorporation of the eighth amendment into the fourteenth
121 Id. 103.
122487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
123Id. 890.
See also Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). Cf. Kish v. Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.
1971) (implicit recognition of duty when assault on prisoner was caused by overcrowding, not by any fault of prison officials).
124 See, e.g., Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974); Curtis v. Everette,
489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). See also Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An
Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 909-15 (1977).
125 At times courts will look to state statutes to find the necessary duty of care
on the part of prison officials. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.8
(1976). Although such statutes may be illustrative of the duties of prison officials,
they are not determinative. The activities held violative in cases depending on a
statute for the existence of a duty would constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
even in the absence of such a statute.
126 At one time federal courts frequently invoked the "hands-off" doctrine, refusing to entertain state prisoners' petitions on the ground that prison administration
was properly within the scope of the executive and legislative branches of government. Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969). See Robbins &
Buser, supra note 124, at 898-900; Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State
Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 27 A.m. U.L. REv. 92, 100-01 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Inadequate Medical Treatment]; Note, Beyond the Ken of
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506 (1963).

In recent years the effects of the doctrine have been substantially lessened. As
the Fifth Circuit stated in Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1978), "it
can no longer be correctly asserted that the federal courts are unwilling in all situations to review the actions of state prison administrators to determine the existence
of possible violations of constitutional rights." Id. 556. Although courts sometimes
refer to the wide area of unrevie-wable discretion that must be accorded to prison
administrators, see United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 721 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Guiterrez v. Department of Pub. Safety, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974); Sostre v. McGinnis, 422 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), the federal
courts no longer hesitate "to entertain petitions asserting violations of fundamental
rights and, where indicated, to grant relief." Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 522 (2d
Cir. 1967).
127365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Soc. Sen.
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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in Robinson v. California128 in 1962, made it possible for state
prisoners to bring federal suits to redress eighth amendment violations committed by state prison officials. Eventually the question
arose whether allegations of official negligence were sufficient to support an eighth amendment action brought pursuant to section 1983.
1. Non-Medical Cases
29
the
In non-medical cases decided prior to Estelle v. Gamble,1
lower federal courts were divided as to the proper answer to the
question of the sufficiency of negligence under the eighth amendment. In Roberts v. Williams,130 the Fifth Circuit ruled that a
prison farm director could be held liable for injuries to a young
prisoner who had been negligently shot by a trusty. 3 1 The director
was liable for having negligently entrusted a shotgun to the trusty
without providing instructions as to its proper use. 32 Similarly, in
Byrd v. Brishke,133 the Seventh Circuit upheld a claim against police
officers who failed to prevent other officers from injuring the plaintiff. The court stated that "to hold otherwise would be to insulate
nonsupervisory officers from liability for reasonably foreseeable consequences of the neglect of their duty to enforce the laws." 134
In Wright v. McMann,135 the plaintiff suffered injuries as a consequence of spending time in a strip cell. The circuit court upheld
the district court's award of damages to the plaintiff, holding that
the warden was or should have been aware of the unconstitutional
conditions existing in this segregation unit. The court held the
warden liable for the natural consequences of his actions in failing
36
to effect a remedy'

128370 U.S. 660 (1962).
129429 U.S. 97 (1976). It should be noted that this discussion of the preEstelle case law is historical in nature. The positions taken by various courts on
§ 1983 eighth amendment questions may no longer be consistent with the decisions
cited, although the cases have not been formally overruled. Compare, e.g., Bogard
v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that immunity doctrines may
sometimes preclude § 1983 actions based on negligence) with Roberts v. Williams,
456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding a prison director subject to liability for
negligently entrusting the gun that injured plaintiff to a trusty); and Patzig v.
O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that in order to establish an eighth
amendment violation deliberate indifference is required) with Howell v. Cataldi,
464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting the possibility of an eighth amendment action
based on culpable negligence).
130456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
131 A "trusty" is an inmate given special tasks and privileges.

F.2d 819, 823 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
134 Id. 11.
135 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972).
136 Id. 135.
132 456
'33
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One circuit court looked to patterns of danger or misconduct
to determine whether the plaintiff's eighth amendment rights had
been violated. In Woodhous v. Virginia,13 the Fourth Circuit
ruled that a prisoner could bring an eighth amendment claim based
on sexual attack and assault by other prisoners. The circuit court
reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded to determine
whether the plaintiff could show whether "a pervasive risk of harm
to inmates from other prisoners" existed and "whether the officials
[were] exercising reasonable care to prevent prisoners from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of
harn." 138
In United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,13 9 a Seventh Circuit
case decided one year after Byrd v. Brishke, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that a single instance of negligence on the part of
prison officials constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The
Miller court focused on the nature of the word "punishment," concluding that the officials' alleged negligence, although it resulted in
serious injury to the plaintiff who consequently was attacked by a
fellow inmate wielding a baseball bat, was not "punishment"
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
The above discussion has demonstrated that non-medical eighth
amendment cases decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Estelle v. Gamble in 1976 came to varied conclusions regarding the
actionability of negligence under the eighth amendment. Despite
the divergence of opinion among the circuits with respect to nonmedical eighth amendment actions, in the area of medical mistreatment claims judicial opinion coalesced around a common standard.
2. The Special Case of Medical Mistreatment
Although the case law did not develop a commonly accepted
general standard for all section 1983 eighth amendment claims,
"deliberate" or "callous" indifference gained widespread acceptance
as the appropriate standard to be applied in medical cases. 1 40 In
137487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
138 Id. 890.
139

479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Gutierrez v. Depart-

ment of Pub. Safety, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
140 See, e.g., cases cited in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976)
(Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1975); Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v.
Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974); Dewell v.
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Williams v. Vincent,141 the Second Circuit noted that "deliberate
indifference by prison authorities to a prisoner's request for essential medical treatment" 142 states a cause of action under section
1983 and the eighth amendment; in Wilbron v. Hutto,143 the
Eighth Circuit stated that "[a]llegations of mere negligence in the
treatment of a prisoner's condition or claims based upon differences
of opinion over matters of medical judgment fail to state a federal
constitutional question absent special circumstances." 144 The
Seventh Circuit pointed out the special nature of medical mistreatment by stating: "Courts will not attempt to second-guess licensed
physicians as to the propriety of a particular course of medical
treatment for a given prisoner-patient." 145
The standard of deliberate indifference for medical cases has
even been applied in circuits where some form of negligence was
recognized as actionable for other section 1983 eighth amendment
claims. 1 46 These courts have held that to establish an eighth amendment action under section 1983 for incidents of medical mistreatment, the medical mistreatment must be the result of deliberate
indifference. In Estelle v. Gamble, 41 7 the Supreme Court approved
the actions of the lower federal courts by requiring that standard.
IV. Estelle v. Gamble AND ITS PROGENY
A. Estelle v. Gamble
In November 1976, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Estelle v. Gamble, 48 its only opinion in an eighth amendment case
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of a state
prisoner's right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by
Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir.
1973); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970); Gittlemacker v. Prasse,

428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970)).
For a discussion of the evolution of the deliberate indifference standard, see
Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for
Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REv. 921, 923-36 (1977).
141 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
142 Id. 544.
143 509 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1975).
144 Id. 622.
145 Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas
v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
146 E.g., compare Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975) with Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
147

429 U.S. 97 (1976).

-148429 U.S. 97 (1976); see text accompanying notes 170-80 supra.

1978]

ACTIONABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE

medical mistreatment. 149 The Court's holding affirmed the deliberate indifference standard applied by most lower federal courts
in similar cases. 150 Nevertheless, Estelle's approach to the complex
issues involved is of interest and importance to future litigation.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, examined initially the
standards developed by the Court in prior eighth amendment cases,
thereby avoiding the question of possible statutory standards of
conduct under section 1983. It is significant that the Court based
the Estelle decision on an interpretation of the eighth amendment
as applied to the states through the fourteenth. Although not determinative, the fact that the Court did not look to the statute but
instead went directly to the constitutional standards necessary to
decide the case, appears to indicate that the Court does not interpret
section 1983 as imposing a general standard of conduct. 151
The Court decided the constitutional issue on the basis
of eighth amendment precedent, concluding that "infliction of
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards
of decency." 152 Justice Marshall noted that denial of medical care
could violate this test by resulting in such an infliction of unnecessary suffering. An inmate depends upon prison authorities to treat
his medical needs; 153 if these needs are not met,
[i]n the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce
physical "torture or a lingering death," . . . the evils of
most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment.
In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in
pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose. 154
The Court thus.first focused solely on the nature of the harm
suffered. In enunciating a standard by which to judge the actionability of eighth amendment claims, however, the Court changed
the focus of the analysis, stating that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and
-149The plaintiff prisoner brought the action against the state corrections department medical director and two correctional officers, claiming that as a result of in-

adequate treatment of a back injury he received while doing a prison work assignment he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 98, 101.
'5o Id.104, 106 n.14.
251 The Court has also directly considered the constitutional issues in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1975).
152 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
:53 See text accompanying notes 113-25 supra.
154 429 U.S. at 103-04.
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wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." 5 The Court failed to explain adequately this incorporation of the subjective motivation of prison officials; a partial
explanation can be gleamed from language found later in the
opinion, which states:
An accident, although it may produce added anguish, is
not on that basis alone to be considered as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain....
Similarly, in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
or to be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." 15
From this language it may be inferred that serious harm standing alone is not sufficient to violate the eighth amendment in cases
of alleged medical mistreatment; the motivation of the individual
whose act or omission produces the harm must also be considered.
This inference helps to explain why the Court adopted the deliberate indifference standard for medical cases. The Court stated
that the eighth amendment is violated when deliberate indifference
is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of
how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.5r,
Even though the Court adopts a deliberate indifference standard, however, the scope of this standard is unclear. On the one
hand, an element of intent is introduced, but it is one that can be
manifested by any form of deliberate indifference.15 8 More important for the purposes of this inquiry, however, is whether the
deliberate indifference standard applies to both prison doctors and
guards as well. 59 The latter question arises as a result of an
255 Id. 104
156 Id. 105-06.
157Id. 104-05

(footnotes omitted).

indifference" as involving
an element of intent, however, because many of the circuit court cases cited by the
158 It is unlikely that the Court envisioned "deliberate

Supreme Court as authority for the deliberate indifference standard defined it to include gross incompetence or recklessness. See note 140 supra.
159 Some of the circuit courts using the deliberate indifference standard for
medical cases specifically referred to doctors in applying the standard. See text accompanying notes 140-47 supra.
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example given by the opinion and by the Court's disposition of the
case with respect to the individual defendants. First, the Court
gave the following illustration of a medical claim to which the
deliberate indifference standard is applicable: "[A] complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment
under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner." "GOThis illustration would appear to be applicable only
to medical personnel, in opposition to the earlier enunciation of
the deliberate indifference standard.' 61
The breadth of the deliberate indifference standard is further
confused by the Court's disposition of the case. The action against
the prison doctor was ordered dismissed, but the case was remanded
for consideration of whether a cause of action was stated against
the other prison officials. 16 2 This resolution leaves unanswered the
question whether deliberate indifference excludes malpractice actions against physicians without precluding medical mistreatment
actions based on the negligence of other officials.
There is a reasonable distinction to be drawn between a doctor's liability for medical malpractice and a guard's liability for
negligence that results in a medical injury to a prisoner. As discussed above, 16 3 a prisoner must rely on prison officials to treat his
medical needs. Thus the government has an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." 164 Malpractice on the part of a physician would not constitute a violation of this governmental duty. Although the doctor's
acts as an agent of the state constitute state action, the tortious
conduct is uniquely related to his medical skill, not to his position
as a prison official 165 (unless, of course, the doctor is deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs because he is a prisoner).
It is questionable whether the same can be said of the negligent
failure of prison guards to inform a doctor that a prisoner is in
need of medical treatment. Such a failure is directly related to the
160 429 U.S. at 106.
161 See text accompanying note 157

supra.

429 U.S. 108 (1978).
16 3 See text accompanying note 121 supra.

162

164429

U.S. 97, 103 (1978).

165 Some acts of prison doctors, or officials in analogous circumstances, therefore, do constitute constitutional violations. Deliberate indifference is an appropriate
test to determine whether conduct of officials not ordinarily directly related to the
penal function or the obligations of the state to care for its prisoners results in serious
harm. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
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guard's function as a correctional officer and to the state's obligation
to provide medical treatment. If the state provides a licensed
physician, the prisoner is not deprived of medical care by virtue of
his imprisonment. If, on the other hand, a guard fails to report a
prisoner's need for treatment and unnecessary suffering results, the
question is no longer one of medical judgment properly the domain
of state law in the fora of state courts."6 In this situation the
eighth amendment duty to provide medical care has been breached.
In this instance there is no need for deliberate indifference on the
part of the guard to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The
special circumstances that require an examination of intent for
medical personnel are nonexistent for the regular staff and supervisors in the prison.
Another issue resolved ambiguously by Estelle v. Gamble is
whether the deliberate indifference standard is applicable to all
section 1983 eighth amendment claims, or only those involving
medical mistreatment. In some circuits, the lower federal courts
applied a different standard of conduct in medical cases. 7 Estelle
is also limited on its facts to the medical mistreatment situation.
Consideration of the following hypothetical cases demonstrates the
undesirability of applying the Estelle deliberate indifference standard to all eighth amendment actions.
Since a prisoner's risk of medical malpractice is not notably
increased as a result of his imprisonment, the deliberate indifference
standard makes sense in that context.6 8 A different situation, however, is presented by an eighth amendment claim that the negligence
of prison officials subjected the plaintiff to homosexual rape and
assault by other prisoners. The risk of such attacks is clearly
greater in prison than on the outside. 69
166 Malpractice is clearly a matter for the state courts and not the federal
judiciary.
167 See note 146 supra.
168 Mistreatment is a matter of judgment. A failure to provide treatment is a
breach of a duty owed by the state to its prisoners under the eighth amendment,
see id. 103-04; text accompanying notes 113-26 supra, unless the decision that treatment is not required is a deliberate one made by a member of the medical profession.
169 "However they happen to arrive in jails homosexuals pose special problems.
The fact of life is that homosexuals (men and women) seem to be in abundance in
all correctional institutions .... ." R. GOLDFArB, JArLs: THE ULTnvxTE GErTTo 90
(1975). In Kish v. Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971) testimony in the
record showed the widespread nature of the problem of homosexuality and homosexual rape in prisons. The problem may be equally bad for female prisoners, but
women file few civil rights suits, and less research has been done. Haft, Women in

Prison: Discriminatory Practices and Some Legal Solutions, 8

CLEAniNGHOuSE REV.

1 (1974).
Recently homosexual attacks have been recognized as a defense to escape. See,
e.g., Note, Duress-Defense to Escape, 3 AM. J. CGmm. L. 331 (1975).
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Suppose, for instance, that proper supervision of a prison requires that guards be posted on each floor. As a result of the
negligence of a supervisor, no guard is scheduled to work on "D"
block during the evening shift. Consequently, a young prisoner
is gang raped by several other inmates; no one is available to come
to his assistance. The supervisor's negligence clearly was a breach
of the constitutional duty to extend reasonable protection to prison
inmates.
The sole dissenter in Estelle was Justice Stevens, who objected
to the reasoning of the majority on three grounds: (1) the Court
incorrectly applied the standards of Haines v. Kerner 7 0° construing
the handwritten complaint of the plaintiff prisoner too strictly, and
consequently dismissing the case against some of the defendants
prematurely; (2) the Court failed adequately to explain the reasons
why certiorari was granted in the case; and (3) the Court used
ambiguous language that incorrectly implied that subjective motivation is relevant to an inquiry whether the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. 171
The third part of Justice Stevens' dissent is most relevant to
this Comment; this is especially true because the Estelle dissent
seems to be a departure from the position taken by Justice (then
Judge) Stevens in his opinion in United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey. 172 In Miller, the Seventh Circuit held that
the [eighth] amendment may be violated either by the intentional infliction of punishment which is cruel or by
such callous indifference to the predictable consequences
of substandard prison conditions that an official intent to
inflict unwarranted harm may be inferred. In the former
instance, the issue is whether the punishment inflicted
is "cruel and unusual"; in the latter, the issue is whether
the harm suffered .

.

. is "punishment" within the mean-

ing of the Eighth Amendment. Quite clearly the allegation that defendants... were negligent.., on one occasion
is insufficient to establish that they inflicted "punishment"
on [plaintiff]. 73
The above language, written by Justice Stevens when he was a
circuit judge three years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
170404 U.S. 519 (1972).
171429 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1976).
172479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
173 Id. 719-20.
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Estelle v. Gamble, 74 suggests both that subjective motivation is
relevant to the question whether the eighth amendment has been
violated and that official mistreatment of, or failure to protect, a
prisoner must in itself constitute punishment in order to violate
the eighth amendment. In contrast, Justice Stevens' dissent in
Estelle stated that
by its repeated references to "deliberate indifference" and
the "intentional" denial of adequate medical care, I
believe the Court improperly attaches significance to the
subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for
determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has
been inflicted. Subjective motivation may well determine
what, if any, remedy is appropriate against a particular
defendant. However, whether the constitutional standard
has been violated should turn on the character of the
punishment rather than the motivation of the individual
who inflicted it.175
This language implies that Justice Stevens might view Miller
somewhat differently today than he did when the case was decided
in 1973, at least with respect to the question of the relevancy of the
defendant's state of mind to the establishment of an eighth amendment violation. Moreover, a textual footnote to this language 171
suggests that Justice Stevens' view of punishment also has changed.
In that note, Justice Stevens focused on imprisonment itself rather
than the actions of the individual state official as punishment, in
contrast to Miller:
If a State elects to impose imprisonment as a punishment
for crime, I believe it has an obligation to provide the persons in its custody with a health care system which meets
minimal standards of adequacy. As a part of that basic
obligation the State and its agents have an affirmative duty
to provide competent, diligent medical personnel, and to
ensure that prescribed care is in fact delivered. For denial of medical care is surely not part of the punishment
77
which civilized nations may impose for crimes.Y
Thus, the views expressed by Justice Stevens in Estelle may be
summarized as follows: (1) subjective motivation is not a consid429 U.S. 97 (1976).
175 Id. 116-17.

174

176

Id. 116 n.13.

177 d.
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eration in determining whether the eighth amendment has been
violated; 178 and (2) the misconduct of the state official need not
constitute "punishment" in itself, because the "punishment" is imprisonment; therefore the correct question in prisoners' eighth
amendment actions is whether the state has violated its duty to
provide adequate conditions of confinement-i.e., whether the conditions of the imprisonment are cruel and unusual. This mode
of analysis is preferable to that of Miller. It leads to the conclusion that, whether prison conditions are "the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty," 179 the correct question is whether these
conditions are "cruel and inhuman"; 180 if so, the eighth amendment
has been violated.
Precluding section 1983 suits based on the negligent violation
of the eighth amendment easily could make correctional officers less
cognizant of their constitutional obligations to prisoners. This is
especially true with respect to supervisory officials.1 s ' It is often
very difficult to show that these people were deliberately indifferent
to a prisoner's needs. It is also true that state immunities can make
state suits against these officials fruitless. 18 2 If he cannot bring an
178 This Comment is essentially in agreement with this reading of the Stevens
dissent in Estelle. The test proposed at text accompanying notes 210-25 infra does
not preclude consideration of subjective motivation in certain limited circumstances
in which the risk of the particular harm suffered by the prisoner is not increased by
incarceration. For example, in the words of Justice Stevens, "[1like the rest of us,
prisoners must take the risk that a competent, diligent physician will make an error."
429 U.S. at 116 n.13. The risk of medical malpractice is not ordinarily increased
by incarceration. In cases such as medical malpractice, wherein the risk is not increased by imprisonment, the eighth amendment may still be violated by wanton
infliction of pain resulting from the intentional misconduct or deliberate indifference
of prison officials. When a doctor is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's medical
needs, or intentionally mistreats a prisoner-patient, he engages in the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain that violates the eighth amendment, whether or not the
risk of the harm suffered is increased by incarceration.
179429 U.S. 97, 116-17 (1976).
180 Id. 117 n.13.
181 Without allowing § 1983 eighth amendment actions based on negligence, it
would frequently be impossible to show that a supervisor was deliberately indifferent to the danger leading to the harm suffered by a prisoner, especially if the
prisoner is required to show deliberate indifference to him personally. Although
some eighth amendment claims based on negligence of supervisory officials involve
attacks by other inmates on the plaintiff, the negligence of the official is a substantial
contributing factor in the injury. Of course, even if eighth amendment negligence
actions are allowed, the official would be protected by ordinary principles of tort
law when his act or omission was reasonable; in such cases the harm occurring was
not within the scope of the risk, or the official's conduct was not the proximate cause
of the harm. Respondeat superior is not applicable. See note 102 supra.
182 For example, "[sas a rule, state courts are unreceptive to inmates' medical
malpractice actions against state correctional personnel" Inadequate Medical Treatment, supra note 126, at 116. For a discussion of state court obstacles to prisoner
medical mistreatment actions, see id. These difficulties, involving state immunities
and other barriers to suit, are illustrative of obstacles encountered in bringing other
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eighth amendment action in federal court, a prisoner may find himself without a remedy for the unnecessary suffering inflicted upon
him.
A distinction between complaints based on medical decisions
and those based on other grounds is therefore justified. There are
valid reasons why deliberate indifference should be the standard
applied to malpractice against physicians' claims and to some other
medical suits brought as eighth amendment actions under section
1983. In the medical cases, the duty to the prisoner is not violated
by negligence. It takes a level of neglect rising to the standard of
deliberate indifference to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The considerations underlying other eighth amendment actions
differ a great deal however. For these claims, the deliberate indif18 3
ference standard is not appropriate.
In summary, the decision in Estelle approved a standard employed by most of the lower federal courts. The Court did not
intertwine section 1983 requirements with the constitutional standards imposed by the eighth amendment, and it clearly identified the
amendment as the basis of the decision. In these ways the Supreme
Court provided some guidance for the lower courts in similar
situations.
B. Case Law After Estelle
Many of the cases decided after Estelle v. Gamble 184 involved
medical malpractice claims. Since the Estelle decision affirmed the
application of the standard applied by most lower federal courts,
these cases have not been affected by Estelle in any significant way. 185
The standard of "deliberate indifference" simply is given the added
weight of a Supreme Court citation. A few of the subsequent nonmedical section 1983 cases have been decided in disturbing fashions
however: Gamble v. Estelle 1s6 (the Estelle case on remand to the
Fifth Circuit); Little v. Walker
types of prisoner claims as well.

87

a Seventh Circuit case; Patzig v.

As a practical matter, § 1983 may afford prisoners

their only means of redress of constitutional violations by state prison officials.
183 The delineation of the scope of the deliberate indifference standard is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For two lower courts' answers, see text accompanying
notes 194 & 195 infra.
184 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
185 See, e.g., Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
864 (1977); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).
186 554 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
187 552

F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
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89
a case
O'Neil,88 a Third Circuit case; and Jones v. McElroy,1
before a judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, provide
examples.
In Gamble v. Estelle, the Fifth Circuit, on remand, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the claim against the director and the
warden. 9 0 The court made this decision on the basis of a lack of
evidence of any "deliberate indifference" on the part of the nonmedical personnel.' 9 ' This decision is disturbing in that it reads
the Estelle case as requiring the deliberate indifference standard for
all prison personnel in medical mistreatment cases. As was explained earlier, there are valid distinctions to be drawn under the
eighth amendment between medical and nonmedical personnel in
such cases.
In Little v. Walker, the plaintiff filed a civil rights suit under
section 1983 claiming that he "repeatedly suffered acts and threats
of physical violence, sexual assaults, and other crimes perpetrated
by other inmates" 192 as a result of the failure of prison officials and
Illinois Department of Corrections authorities to provide him with
reasonable protection from such attacks. The court applied the
deliberate indifference standard of Estelle v. Gamble, departing
from some earlier Seventh Circuit decisions allowing actions based
upon negligence. As discussed earlier in this Comment, it is questionable whether this standard is appropriate in non-medical cases. 193
The Little court did, however, define "deliberate indifference"
to include both actual intent and recklessness, 94 the definition most
favorable to suits by prisoners if the standard is to be used in nonmedical eighth amendment cases. The district court's dismissal of
the claim was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the circuit court's opinion. Still, by excluding negligence the court may have made the plaintiff's case
much harder to prove, and the prison officials were absolved from

577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
189 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1977); Milburn v. Girard, 429 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (presenting similar problems).
190 554 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
191 Id.
192 552 F.2d 193, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
193 See text accompanying notes 140-49 supra.
194 552 F.2d 193, 197-98 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977). Some courts have also recognized that a pattern of negligent acts or omissions may evidence deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chester Co. Farms Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
188
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the necessity of doing their jobs as well as possible. 95 In an era
when it is commonly demanded that public officials be more responsible in fulfilling the duties and obligations entrusted to them, 9 6
Little v. Walker substantially reduces the threat of civil liability
for a whole class of potential defendants if these demands for greater
responsibility are not met.
Even more disturbing than Little, in Patzig v. O'Neil the
Third Circuit summarily stated that "[i]n order to establish a constitutional violation under the eighth amendment, it is necessary
that there be a deliberate indifference to the prisoner's needs." 197
Moreover, the court defined deliberate indifference to require more
than callous acts or omissions on the part of the defendants, a definition clearly at variance with the Supreme Court's reading of the
callous and deliberate and callous indifference standards as interchangeable. 19
Jones v. McElroy, a fourteenth amendment due process case, is
troublesome in another respect. In a thoughtful examination of the
actionability of negligence under section 1983, Judge Luongo recognized that courts are frequently unclear whether their decisions
in section 1983 actions are based on statutory or constitutional standards. Judge Luongo admitted that "[t]he degree of culpability
necessary for civil rights liability is an unanswered question," 199
but he went on to conclude that "negligence will not support an
action for deprivation of constitutional rights, whether that action
is asserted under § 1983 or directly under the Fourteenth Amendment." 200 To support this conclusion Judge Luongo cited three
recent Supreme Court opinions as suggesting "that intent, and possibly specific purpose, is needed to constitute a constitutional violation." 201 Estelle v. Gamble2 0 2 was one of the decisions cited.
195 Even though the threat of a federal lawsuit may not eliminate all or even
most acts of official negligence, it may encourage state and local prison officials to
take more care in the exercise of their duties.
196 See note 96 supra.
197

577 F.2d at 847.

198

Compare id. 848 with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976).

199 Id. 862.
200 Id. 863.
201 Id. 862. The decisions cited were: Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). It is important to note that
Estelle did not require intent, and that Arlington Heights and Washington were
equal protection cases. Even if the equal protection clause imposes a constitutional

requirement of some type of intent, there is no reason to infer from this that intent
is required to establish any other constitutional deprivation.
202 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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Since Justice Marshall specifically stated that Estelle was based on
the eighth amendment, 20 3 it is unfortunate that it is used to support a general standard for all section 1983 actions. It is equally
disturbing to find a federal judge interpreting Estelle to require
intent.
In the preceding subsection of this Comment, some of the ambiguities of Estelle v. Gamble were discussed. Gamble v. Estelle,
Little v. Walker, Patzig v. O'Neil, and Jones v. McElroy illustrate
how lower courts may interpret the opinion as a result of these
ambiguities. This could result in an application of standards appropriate for medical cases to other eighth amendment actions without a consideration of the underlying policies and implications of
such an extension. Another potential outcome of the lower courts'
reading of Estelle may be a sub silentio "overruling" of Monroe v.
Pape 2o4 by the lower courts with the consequence that a general
standard of care for all section 1983 actions will be assumed to be
mandatory, and the language of Monroe that section 1983 "should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions" 205 ignored.
The Supreme Court has declined to go this far, and perhaps its
handling of Estelle v. Gamble,20 6 Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,207 and Washington v. Davis2 08 should be interpreted as tacit recognition that different standards of conduct are required to state a valid cause of action
under different constitutional guarantees. If other courts follow
Jones v. McElroy,20 9 however, it will be necessary for the Supreme
Court to take a stand on the issue.
This Comment concludes that no general standard of care applicable to all section 1983 actions exists, and that it is inappropriate
to have a single standard for all eighth amendment claims. Whether
the Supreme Court ultimately would agree with these conclusions
or not, it is disturbing that in one of the most significant section
1983 cases since Monroe v. Pape the Court merely reaffirmed the
case law developed in the lower federal courts, and failed to provide
adequate guidance on any of the difficult issues that have created
203

Id. 147.

204 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

205 Id. 187.

206429 U.S. 97 (1976).
U.S. 252 (1977).
208426 U.S. 229 (1976).
209 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977).

207429
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great confusion and divergence of opinion among circuit and district court judges.
V. A PROPOSED TEST
Assuming, as argued in the preceding sections of this Comment, that section 1983 imposes no general standard of care, and
that negligent acts and omissions can result in a violation of the
eighth amendment, a method is needed for determining when negligence is actionable in section 1983 eighth amendment cases. This
section proposes a test to enable such a determination to be made.
In the sixteen year interval separating Estelle v. Gamble 210 and
Monroe v. Pape,21 1 the lower federal courts generally agreed that
deliberate indifference was the appropriate standard for eighth
amendment medical claims; 212 this was true even in those circuits
in which negligence was recognized as actionable in non-medical
eighth amendment cases. 213 In Estelle, the majority opinion expressed the view that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." 214
In his dissent Justice Stevens articulated the problem:
[N]ot every instance of improper health care violates the
Eighth Amendment. Like the rest of us prisoners must
take the risk that a competent, diligent physician will make
an error. Such an error may give rise to a tort claim but
not necessarily to a constitutional claim. But when the
State adds to this risk, . . then the prisoner may suffer
15
from a breach of the State's constitutional duty.2

The decisions of the lower courts, the illustration used by the
Estelle majority, 210 and Justice Stevens' views suggest a certain
uniqueness about medical malpractice. This in turn suggests a
general test for determining the sufficiency of negligence to establish a state prisoner's section 1983 action based on the violation of
his eighth amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment: 217
210 429

U.S. 97 (1976).

211 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

212 See, e.g., cases cited in note 140 supra.
213 See note 146 supra.
214 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

215 Id. 116-17 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 See text accompanying note 160 supra.
217 The limitations of ordinary tort law such as foreseeability of the risk would
apply as in any other negligence action.
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(1) Whether the harm suffered is serious in nature; and
(2) Whether the risk of the harm is increased substantially
by the plaintiff's incarceration in a state prison. 218
The first question is a necessary component of any eighth
amendment test, for if the harm suffered is not sufficiently severe
it cannot be called cruel and unusual and there can be no violation of the eighth amendment. 219 The second question offers an
opportunity to ask whether an eighth amendment violation is
claimed "merely because the victim is a prisoner," 220 or whether
the foundation of the claim is harm resulting from a risk made
much more grave by reason of the prisoner's incarceration. This
second criterion incorporates the question of violation of a state's
constitutional duty, e.g., to provide medical care, or to afford reasonable protection from violent attacks and sexual assaults by other
prisoners.
This test might be expressed as follows: the sufficiency of
negligence to establish a violation of the eighth amendment is a
function of the gravity of the harm suffered and the increase in the
risk of the harm resulting from incarceration. Where this test is
met, the negligence of the official amounts to a breach of the state's
constitutional duty to the prisoner 221 and is therefore a violation
of the eighth amendment. Under this standard, negligence is not
sufficient in the case of medical malpractice, for however serious the
harm, the increase in risk due to incarceration is not substantial.
218This criterion is very similar to the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in
prison assault cases. In Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 U.S. 889 (4th Cir. 1973), the
Court held that official negligence in failing to prevent attacks on one prisoner by
another would violate the eighth amendment if plaintiff could establish a pervasive
risk of harm. In Doe v. Swinson, No. 76-91-A (E.D. Va., filed Nov. 24, 1976),

vacated, Dec. 22, 1976 (appeal dismissed upon settlement of $20,000 to be paid by

defendant sheriff's indemnifier), the district court stated that "the necessary pattern
of violence need not be limited to the inmate or even a single penal institution in
which the inmate is held but may be that occurring in similar institutions in the
area." No. 76-91-A, slip op. at 11. The requirement of a pervasive risk of harm is
thus directed to whether there is an increased risk of the particular harm. These
Fourth Circuit cases do not require a pattern of negligence. But cf. United States
ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) (single incidence of official
negligence cannot constitute punishment). In cases in which there is an increased
risk of the harm because of incarceration, a single negligent act can violate the

eighth amendment. This was the case in Swinson.
219 Whether any unnecessary suffering inflicted upon a prisoner constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment regardless of the gravity is not considered in this Comment.
Such a possibility is suggested by Justice Marshall in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, at 103-04 (1976).
220

Id. 106.

221See, e.g., 429 U.S. at 103 (duty to provide medical care); Woodhous v.
Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (duty to provide reasonable protection
from violence and sexual assault).
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The following cases are illustrative of situations in which the proposed test will not be met:
(1) Prisoner is injured by negligently driven prison truck.
(There is no increased risk of this harm due to incarceration. The negligent failure to guard against this risk is
not violative of any constitutional duty.)
(2) Prisoner is hurt when a kitchen employee negligently
drops a tray on his foot. (Here again, the risk is not substantially increased.)
(3) Prisoner suffers with a slight eye irritation for two days
when a guard negligently fails to inform the prison doctor
that the prisoner wants to see him. (While in this case
the negligence is of constitutional dimension, the gravity
of the harm suffered is not severe enough to constitute
"cruel and unusual" punishment.)
Negligence would be sufficient to create a cause of action in the
following hypothetical cases:
(1) Prison warden negligently fails to supervise guards
properly. As a result a guard is not posted on a floor
where a young inmate is quartered, and the young man is
raped by a gang of other inmates. 222 (The risk of homosexual rape is substantially increased by imprisonment. 223
Negligent failure to protect therefore violates the constitutional duty. The harm of a gang rape is serious enough
to satisfy the cruel and unusual requirement.)
(2) Prison guard negligently fails to inform doctor that
prisoner is in severe pain. Prisoner suffers ruptured appendix. (The risk of inability to obtain access to a doctor
is increased by incarceration; the harm to the prisoner is
severe.)
Estelle v. Gamble,224 then, is decided correctly under this test
with respect to the liability of the prisoner's doctors. 22 To the
222 Somewhat simplified, these are the facts of Doe v. Swinson, No. 76-91-A
(E.D. Va., filed Nov. 24, 1976), vacated Dec. 22, 1976 (appeal dismissed upon
settlement of $20,000 to be paid by defendant sheriff's indemnifier). See note 218
supra. Cf. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Judge Huyett
concluded that "findings of general knowledge combined with direct supervisory
control may be sufficient to hold an official personally involved in the unlawful acts
of his subordinates and thereby liable under section 1983." Id. 951).
223 See note 169 supra.
224429
225The

U.S. 97 (1976).
action against the doctor was dismissed. Id. 108.
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extent that Estelle is meant to require more than negligence with
respect to the acts or omissions of the prison guards and other officials, it is wrong. The state has a duty to provide medical care to
those whom it punishes by imprisonment. The risk of being unable
to acquire adequate medical attention is increased by incarceration.
The failure of the prison guard to take the prisoner to the infirmary
is, therefore, an eighth amendment violation. The risk of medical
malpractice is not similarly increased. Therefore negligence on the
part of prison doctors is not actionable under this test. A prison
doctor, however, can still be liable for deliberate infliction of unnecessary pain upon a prisoner; the proposed test only answers the
question of when negligence is actionable.
This test does not provide for strict liability for serious harm
caused to prisoners in situations of increased risk due to incarceration. An initial determination of negligence must still be made.
The activities of the particular defendant must be unreasonable
given the circumstances.226 There is a general duty of tort law
not to act (or fail to act) unreasonably; there is in addition a constitutional duty to provide certain necessities to prisoners. This
test is concerned with when a violation of the initial duty-a negligent act-rises to the level of the second-a constitutional deprivation. The former is a requisite of the latter under this test. This
burden should be sufficient to protect the discretion of prison officials in administering their prisons.
This test will not solve all of the complex problems of eighth
amendment claims. It does, however, provide a mode of analysis;
this is one thing that has been sorely lacking in many cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

It has now been over one hundred years since Congress enacted
the statute we know today as section 1983. The legislative history
demonstrates that section 1983 was intended as a remedy for all
violations of fundamental constitutional rights by state officials.
There is no logical basis for reading into the statute a standard of
conduct requirement, and to do so as a means of reducing the
number of prisoner complaints brought in federal court is both
arbitrary and unjust. Whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action based on official negligence
should turn on the standard of conduct required for the specific
constitutional deprivation he alleges.
226 The plaintiff failed to pass this reasonableness test in Kish v. Milwaukee, 441
F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
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The language of the eighth amendment suggests that not all
instances of official negligence resulting in harm to prisoners result in deprivation of constitutional rights. Courts have struggled
to determine when official negligence should be actionable under
the eighth amendment, but the results have been unsatisfactory in
many cases. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court appeared to
require intentional or reckless conduct to state an actionable claim
with respect to medical mistreatment cases. This Comment has
argued that this choice is justified in the case of a malpractice claim
against a prison doctor. A like result would be correct with respect
to any injury suffered by a prisoner resulting from the negligence
of a prison official in an area not directly related to the punishment function and concurrent obligations of the state. Support for
this conclusion is found in the fact that even among the circuit
courts holding some form of negligence sufficient to state an eighth
amendment cause of action, medical malpractice claims were required to allege deliberate or callous indifference on the part of
prison medical personnel to establish a constitutional deprivation.
It is possible to infer from these decisions that judges were intuitively acting upon the belief that if the risk of a particular injury
is not significantly increased by imprisonment, then the injury complained of must be the result of deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's welfare on the part of the defendant prison official. This is
the essence of the eighth amendment test proposed by this Comment.
Whether or not the test proposed herein is regarded as a useful means of determining whether the eighth amendment has been
violated, some coherent framework of analysis for eighth amendment claims must be developed. Equally important, the general
question of a standard of conduct under section 1983 must be decided. Until the Supreme Court addresses these issues directly,
courts may well continue to intermingle statutory and constitutional
interpretations producing results that are neither sound nor just.

